A Myriad of Contradiction with Title VII Arbitration Agreements - Duffield as the Past, Austin as the Future, and the EEOC as the Target of Restructing by Hartmann, Michelle
SMU Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 1 Article 17
2001
A Myriad of Contradiction with Title VII
Arbitration Agreements - Duffield as the Past,
Austin as the Future, and the EEOC as the Target of
Restructing
Michelle Hartmann
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle Hartmann, A Myriad of Contradiction with Title VII Arbitration Agreements - Duffield as the Past, Austin as the Future, and the
EEOC as the Target of Restructing, 54 SMU L. Rev. 359 (2001)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol54/iss1/17
A MYRIAD OF CONTRADICTION WITH
TITLE VII ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS-
DUFFIELD AS THE PAST, AUSTIN AS THE




I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 360
II. DUFFIELD ALONE REJECTS MANDATORY TITLE
VII ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED AS A
CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT ....................... 362
A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS UNANIMOUSLY REJECT
MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
FOLLOWING GARDNER-DENVER ....................... 362
B. ABRUPT CHANGE IN TREATMENT OF MANDATORY
TITLE VII ARBITRATION FOLLOWING GILMER ........ 364
C. DUFFIELD REJECTS THE HOLDING OF OTHER CIRCUITS
BY EMPHASIZING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO TITLE
V II .................................................... 366
D. THE LIKELY FUTURE OF COMPULSORY TITLE VII
ARBITRATION IN INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS SIGNED AS
A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT ....................... 367
III. CONVERSELY, AUSTIN ALONE UPHOLDS
MANDATORY TITLE VII ARBITRATION UNDER
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ......... 370
A. THE CURRENT SETrING: A FEDERAL FAVORING OF
ARBITRATION-BoTH UNDER THE FAA AND UNDER
THE LMRA-SETS THE STAGE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF
CBA W AIVERS ........................................ 372
B. THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT TO RECOGNIZE "CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE"
WAIVERS IN CBAs DESPITE GARDNER-DENVER'S
PROHIBITION LIKELY CONTEMPLATES THE ABILITY TO
* Candidate for J.D., Southern Methodist University, May, 2001. Judicial clerk for
the Honorable Barbara M.G. Lynn, Northern District of Texas, 2001-2002; Judicial clerk
for the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King, Chief Judge for the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 2002-2003.
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
WAIVE TITLE VII's JUDICIAL FORUM GRANT
THROUGH A CBA ..................................... 375
C. BECAUSE A VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS Is NOT INHERENTLY AT ODDS WITH
COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION BY A UNION, A CBA
WAIVER SHOULD BE ENFORCED ...................... 378
D. STARE DECISIS AND THE REALITY OF TITLE VII's
PLAIN MEANING MANIFESTS A NEED TO OVERRULE
GARDNER-DENVER WITH RESPECT CBA WAIVERS.... 381
IV. THE EEOC STANDS ALONE IN ITS HYPOCRITICAL
POLICY AGAINST EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
AGREEM ENTS .......................................... 383
A. DESPITE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT EMBRACING
ARBITRATION AND REGARDLESS OF THE FAA, THE
EEOC's CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER
ARBITRATION CONTRACTS CREATES AN INCONSISTENT
PLIGHT ................................................ 383
B. INHERENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE EEOC's DUAL
ROLE AND THE MODERN RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT MANDATE
RESTRUCTURING ...................................... 387
C. TooLs, SUCH AS CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS, AND
REQUIRED REPORTING, MIGHT MEND THE
CONFUSION ........................................... 391
V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 394
I. INTRODUCTION
S several commentators note, practitioners wishing to accurately
advise their clients on the success of mandatory arbitration
clauses covering Title VII claims will likely have trouble.1 Al-
though the use of arbitration as an alternative to judicial resolution is
increasing remarkably,2 the legal chaos resulting from unanswered ques-
1. See Alexandra Varney McDonald, Escape from Arbitration, ABA J., Aug. 1999, at
33 (discussing the tension amongst the circuits over mandatory arbitration agreements of
statutory claims, and quoting Marc Greenbaum, law professor at Suffolk University in Bos-
ton, as having "a lot of discomfort with the idea that an employer can.., effectively waive
a judicial forum").
2. See Developments in Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568,
1672 n.20 (1996) (noting that "[tihe number of employment disputes in federal courts in-
creased twenty fold between 1971 and 1991, an increase that is 1000% greater than that of
all other types of civil litigation combined") (citing Hope B. Eastman & David M. Rothen-
stein, The Fate of Mandatory Employment Arbitration Amidst Growing Opposition: A Call
for Common Ground, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 595 (1995)); Judith Batson Sadler,
Mandatory Arbitration: Recent Developments After Gilmer in the Evolving Area of Dispute
Resolution Through the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, AMERICAN BAR As-
soc., 1999 Annual Mtg., at 1 (stating that "Employers have turned to mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements for several reasons not the least of which is the perception that arbitration
provides a way to reduce legal costs").
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tions in major Supreme Court cases dealing with pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and conflicting pronouncements by the agency directly re-
sponsible for managing Title VII claims leaves many in the legal commu-
nity concerned. 3 In contrast to commentary presently in the academic
marketplace of ideas, this Comment argues that arbitration clauses signed
by an individual as a condition of employment should be treated no dif-
ferently than those negotiated by a union into a collective bargaining
agreement.
This paper looks to past actions by courts and agencies in order to pre-
sent a prospective view of the mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims.
Part I examines Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,4 where the Ninth
Circuit held that an employer could not enforce a mandatory arbitration
agreement against an employee's Title VII claim even though she signed
this agreement as a condition of her employment. Recent case law within
the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction strengthens Duffield's reach. Duffield con-
trasts with the likely future, favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses.
Part II analyzes Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,5
where the Fourth Circuit held that a mandatory arbitration contract con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement was enforceable to preclude
an individual from bringing her Title VII claim to a judicial forum. Austin
approximates the future despite the overwhelming attempt by circuit
courts to dismantle its effect.
Part III looks to the EEOC, particularly at its current standoff against
the overwhelming judicial precedent concerning arbitration. By taking
an unequivocal and unyielding stance against mandatory arbitration
agreements in the employment context, the EEOC necessarily paves a
future where congressional reformation of the goals and the purposes of
the organization is in order.
With these three sections in mind, the analysis divides types of
mandatory Title VII arbitration agreements into two groups- individual
employment agreements and collective bargaining arbitration
agreements. 6
3. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 1, 2, 7-8 (Fall 1996) (discussing
recent legal developments in arbitration and "unanswered questions which persist in their
wake," and adopting the liberal view that "even 'neutral' arbitration procedures are more
likely to operate to the institutional advantage of employers").
4. 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998).
5. 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
6. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (seem-
ingly dividing court holdings between those based on union represented agreements and
those based on individual arbitration agreements, and finding that the CBA cases "provide
no basis for refusing to enforce [an individual consensual] agreement to arbitrate") (quot-
ing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)).
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II. DUFFIELD ALONE REJECTS MANDATORY TITLE VII
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED AS A
CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
This Section discusses the current treatment of mandatory Title VII
arbitration, where an individual employee signs a pre-dispute waiver as a
condition of initial or continued employment.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,7 the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 8 in "re-
vers[ing] the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements...
and [in] plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." It recognized, however, Section 1 of the FAA as exempting
from FAA enforcement "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 While this exception for "contracts of employment" may
play a critical role in the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses
found in collective bargaining agreements, it has not been interpreted by
most courts as a major stumbling block as to individual employment
agreements. 10 That said, the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the FAA
does not apply to contracts of employment and reversed a district court
ruling compelling arbitration." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams was ac-
cepted on certiorari and will likely resolve any dispute in favor of general
FAA applicability as to individual arbitration agreements, as opposed to
certain collective bargaining agreements. 12 Noting general applicability
of the FAA for the purpose of Part II(A) of this Comment, the turbid
precedential history begins.
A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS UNANIMOUSLY REJECT MANDATORY
ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS FOLLOWING GARDNER-DENVER
To demonstrate how full circle the circuits have come, an examination
of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., is necessary. 13 In Gardner-Denver,
the Supreme Court rejected the idea that an employee could prospec-
7. 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
8. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
10. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (joining
the ranks of those courts interpreting Section 1 narrowly as exempting only those employ-
ees directly engaged in the movement of maritime or interstate commerce); Cole v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that a narrow interpreta-
tion of Section 1 is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), which interpreted the words, "in commerce" to mean
"only those workers actually involved in the 'flow' of commerce"); Rojas v. TK Communi-
cations, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Albert v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.,
874 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 1994), as saying that it "is quite impossible to apply a
broad meaning to the term 'commerce' in Section 1 and not rob the rest of the exclusion
clause of all significance").
11. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
12. Id.; see also discussion infra notes 86-92.
13. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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tively waive his right to a judicial forum for the enforcement of Title VII
claims by agreeing to a mandatory arbitration provision in a collective
bargaining agreement. 14 Instead, the Court narrowly held that "there can
be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII."15
Working from this ruling, circuit courts unanimously held that employ-
ers could not preclude employees from bringing their Title VII claims to a
judicial forum through any pre-dispute arbitration agreement. 16 Almost
absolutely, this overwhelming following and the momentum with which it
rejected mandatory arbitration agreements was quelled with one urge by
the Supreme Court.
Gilmer emphatically ruled that "statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."'1 7 Further,
in emphasizing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, the Court
held that "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."'1 8 Although
directly addressing arbitration of Gilmer's ADEA claim, the Court em-
phasized that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."' 9 Thus, the
Court flatly rejected any insinuation that arbitration was an inferior fo-
rum.20 To the contrary, it fully endorsed the use of arbitration for statu-
tory claims where Congress fails to expressly preclude non-judicial
resolution. Accordingly, if the Gardener-Denver progeny that had so ve-
hemently protected the judicial forum as the sole territory for Title VII
judicial resolution was to continue on course, it would have to find that
Congress "explicitly preclude[d] arbitration or other nonjudicial resolu-
tion of claims."' This, they could not do.
14. See id. at 48-49.
15. Id. at 51.
16. See Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an employee was not bound by an arbitration agreement with respect to her
Title VII claims because of concern that the arbitral forum is unable to adequately "as-
sist[ ] victims of discrimination" or to "pay sufficient attention to transcendent public inter-
est in the enforcement of Title VII"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989); Schwartz v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding, in dicta, that Gardner-Denver stood
for the proposition that "[t]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights
under Title VII"); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989) (joining
Gardner-Denver progeny in holding that Title VII claims could not be forced into arbitra-
tion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990).
17. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
18. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
19. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
20. See id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989), to reject claims of the inferior nature of arbitration that "'res[t]
on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the sub-
stantive law to would-be complainants,' and as such, [ ] are 'far out of step with our cur-
rent strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes'").
21. Id. at 29.
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B. ABRUPT CHANGE IN CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF MANDATORY TITLE
VII ARBITRATION FOLLOWING GILMER
Building on the Gilmer ADEA decision, this Section addresses circuit
changes in the treatment of Title VII arbitrability. Like the other circuits
mentioned, the Fifth Circuit initially followed Gardner-Denver's seeming
pronouncement on pre-dispute waivers. This remained its prevailing
view until Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,22 was vacated by the Su-
preme Court for reconsideration in light of Gilmer. On remand, the Fifth
Circuit became the first court to conclude that Title VII claims are subject
to compulsory arbitration under the FAA.23 This decision marked the
complete retreat from decisions rendering arbitration as inferior to judi-
cial resolution and delineated the onset of an apparent embracing of the
arbitral forum as an adequate avenue for dispute resolution of Title VII
claims.24
In Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.,25 the Third Circuit analyzed several gaps
left by Gilmer in hopes of resolving questions of Title VII arbitrability.
Filing an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff's position, the EEOC
argued that an exception to the FAA's liberal policy favoring arbitration
was carved out by Congress in the Title VII context.2 6 Rejecting this ar-
gument, the Court instead held that: "[b]ecause Title VII and the ADEA
'are similar in their aims and substantive provisions,' we find Title VII
entirely compatible with applying the FAA to agreements to arbitrate Ti-
tle VII claims. '27
The Court specifically focused on Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, providing, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative dispute resolution including.., arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [Title VII and the
ADEA]. ' 28 It interpreted this to "evince [ ] a clear Congressional intent
to encourage arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims, not to preclude
22. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
23. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
24. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
"Gilmer to be dispositive of every argument presented by the Plaintiff and the EEOC,"
and granting the defendant's motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff's Title VII claims
subsequent to a Securities Registration Form U-4); Koveleski v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc.,167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999); Metz v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII
claims are subject to mandatory arbitration because of the substantive similarities between
ADEA under Gilmer and Title VII, and the "strong federal policy encouraging the expedi-
tious and inexpensive resolution of disputes through arbitration"); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Desiderio v. Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers,
Inc. 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Compulsory arbitration does not defeat the right to
compensatory and punitive damages, or fee shifting because an arbitrator is also empow-
ered to grant this kind of relief.").
25. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999).
26. See id. at 178.
27. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071(1991) (reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981)).
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such arbitration. '2 9 Further, it focused on the Report of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary to explain §118:
This section "encourages" the voluntary use of conciliation, media-
tion, arbitration, and other methods of resolving disputes under Civil
Rights laws governing employment discrimination. We agree that
voluntary mediation and arbitration are far preferable to prolonged
litigation for resolving employment discrimination claims... We rec-
ognize that mediation and arbitration, knowingly and voluntarily un-
dertaken, are the preferred methods of settlement of employment
discrimination disputes. 30
These references, combined with the fact that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was passed six months after Gilmer, led the Seus Court to join other
circuits in accepting arbitration. 31 The Court did, however, mimic Gilmer
in ensuring that the waiving of one's right to a judicial forum did not
likewise render Title VII's substantive relief invalid. "[B]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial forum."'32 That said, the court also followed Gilmer
in limiting Title VII's reach to "vindication." "[S]o long as the prospec-
tive litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action
in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function. '33
Although initially less willing to interpret Gilmer broadly in Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,34 stating, "obviously, Gilmer cannot be read as
holding that an arbitration agreement is enforceable no matter what
rights it waives or what burdens it imposes," 35 the D.C. Circuit neverthe-
less recognized it as binding authority.36
29. Id. at 182.
30. See id. at 183 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 78 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 764).
31. See Seus v. John Nuveer & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
32. Id. at 180 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
33. Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
34. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
35. Id. at 1482; see also Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbi-
tration of Public-Law Disputes, U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 644 (1995) (commenting that "[t]he
Supreme Court in the Gilmer case did not hold that any sort of arbitration procedure
before any manner of arbitrator would be fundamentally satisfactory in the adjudication of
public rights"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (holding
"[Tihere can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII ... Title VII
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices"); Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding that: "[i]t is the general rule in this circuit that an employee may not pro-
spectively waive his or her rights under either Title VII or the ADEA."); Kendal v. Wat-
kins, 998 F.2d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing that an individual cannot prospectively
waive an employee's rights under Title VII), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1120 (1994).
36. See id. at 1489 (LeCraft Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that, "owing to its impropriety, is the majority's statement that 'it is perhaps mis-
guided to mourn the Supreme Court's endorsement of the arbitration of complex and im-
portant public law claims.' It is more than misguided-it is wrong. We are not in the
business of lamenting or celebrating decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We are
to follow them. Period.") (citations omitted).
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The First Circuit in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., likewise found that "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the 1991 CRA, does not, as a matter of law,
prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements. '37
Rosenberg looked at the purposes of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
and found "no conflict between the language or purpose of Title VII, as
amended, and arbitration. '38
C. DUFFIELD REJECTS THE HOLDING OF OTHER CIRCUITS BY
EMPHASIZING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO TITLE VII
Those opposing mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims admittedly
recognize Gilmer as binding. Nevertheless, they focus on specific statu-
tory language authorizing arbitration under the Civil Rights Act only
"where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."'39 For example,
"to the extent authorized by law" is interpreted by the Ninth Circuit as
referring to the law existing prior to Gilmer. They argue that congres-
sional intent to preclude mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims thus
exists.40
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. sidesteps Gilmer.41 It interprets
this "authorized by law" language as "a polite bow to the popularity of
'alternate dispute resolution,"' in the midst of the Civil Rights Act's "sig-
nificant enlargement of substantive and procedural rights of victims of
employment discrimination. ' 42 The court emphasized the need to look at
the statute and its purpose as a whole, rather than as a single dissected
sentence.43 To that end, it found the uniform purposes of the act in ex-
panding employees' rights and in increasing individual remedies war-
ranted an interpretation of the statute as only mildly supporting
arbitration: "It seems far more plausible that Congress meant to en-
courage voluntary agreements to arbitrate-agreements such as those
that employers and employees enter into after a dispute has arisen be-
cause both parties consider arbitration to be a more satisfactory or expe-
ditious method of resolving the disagreement."' an
37. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 170 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1999).
38. Id. at 8.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
40. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1191 (quoting Chief Judge Posner in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d
354, 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997)).
43. See id. at 1193 (finding "[wihen 'examining the language of the governing statute,'
we must not be guided by 'a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look [ ] to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."') (quoting John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993)); Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (holding that civil rights statutes should be construed broadly);
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 88 (1991) (directing courts "that when the statutory terms in
[Title VIII are susceptible to alternative interpretations, the courts are to select the con-
struction which most effectively advances the underlying congressional purpose").
44. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis added).
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Thus, even though the Civil Rights Act was enacted six months after
Gilmer, the court looked to the law at the time Congress drafted §118 in
concluding that compulsory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII
claims were unenforceable, as a matter of law.45
As further support for rejecting Gilmer as to Title VII, the court ex-
amined the House Committee on Education and Labor's H.R. 1 report,
the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating:
The Committee emphasizes . . . that the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms is ... intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies
provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the committee believes
that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether
in the context of collective bargaining or in an employment contract,
does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,. . . The Committee does not intend this section to be
used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be
available. 46
This legislative history focusing on the need to "supplement" rather
than "supplant" Title VII remedies, combined with the rejection of a Re-
publican proposal that would have allowed employers to enforce "com-
pulsory arbitration" agreements, led Duffield to conclude that Congress
envisioned only voluntary post-dispute arbitration agreements. 47 It also
found persuasive statements made by congressmen in the floor debates
favoring arbitration "where parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use
those methods. '48 Accordingly, the court became the first circuit to hold
that Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims.49 The following Section rejects Duffield's reasoning by emphasiz-
ing its inconsistency with Supreme Court precedent.
D. THE LIKELY FUTURE OF COMPULSORY TITLE VII ARBITRATION
IN INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS SIGNED AS A CONDITION
OF EMPLOYMENT
Duffield and the district courts that follow it undisputedly look to the
45. See id. at 1194 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988), as stat-
ing "we should 'examine initially' the statute 'with an eye toward determining Congress'
perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping"').
46. Id. at 1196 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642) (second emphasis added).
47. Id. at 1196 (holding that "[t]his part of the committee report also eliminates any
possibility that § 118 was in any way a product of legislative compromise that was not
meant to advance the overall purposes of the Act").
48. 137 CONG. REc. S15,472-01, S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole); see also 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Edwards) (stating that "[t]his section contemplates the use of voluntary arbitration to
resolve specific disputes after they have arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees in
advance to forego statutory rights. No approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Gilmer..., or any application or extension of it to Title VII.").
49. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199.
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context, the language, and the legislative history of Title VII.50 In finding
that Congress did not intend to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, the rest of the circuits look instead to the express purposes of Title
VII and the specific language of the statute itself.51 Rather than weighing
committee member support and rejection of pre-dispute waivers, the
question should be whether the goals of the Civil Rights Act conflict with
arbitration of Title VII claims? 52
The Act has at its core the twin goals of restoring civil rights laws by
overruling a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions restricting the read-
ing of Title VII and strengthening Title VII by making it easier for indi-
viduals to bring, sustain, and receive full remedial measures on a Title VII
cause of action.53 Plainly, opponents of arbitration never show how the
arbitral forum conflicts with these stated goals.54 This fatal flaw will
likely lead the Supreme Court to extend Gilmer to the Title VII context.
Reliance on the statements of congressional members and the H.R. 1
bill is misplaced. The Senate substitute to the 1991 bill originally intro-
duced in the House expressly omitted any explicit retroactivity provisions
to Gardner-Denver or to any "Republican substitute. '' 55 Further, in ad-
dressing retroactivity under section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the
Supreme Court held that statements made on the floor of Congress, as
well as rejected drafts, do not explain ambiguous statutory language and
thus, cannot be used as definitive evidence of congressional intent.56
Moreover, the evidence produced from the floor and committees is parti-
san at best. Commentary noted by Duffield told half of the story.57 Ad-
ditional statements by members of Congress express the view that the
Civil Rights Act does not preclude arbitration. 58 Opponents of arbitra-
50. Id.
51. See Rosenberg v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 1999).
52. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27 (holding that the remaining question is whether "com-
pulsory arbitration of [Title VII] claims pursuant to arbitration agreements would be in-
consistent with the statutory framework and purposes of" Title VII).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 78 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
694-696); David Sherwyn, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 104 (Spring 1999).
54. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 11 (looking to the plain meaning of the statute, and
holding that "neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history demonstrate[]
an intent in the 1991 CRA to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements").
55. Sherwyn, supra note 53, at 105-06 (finding that history of the 1991 Act conveys the
impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act
would apply to preenactment conduct") (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
244, 262 (1994)).
56. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-263 (1994).
57. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 (collecting Congress member's statements concern-
ing the arbitrability of Title VII claims).
58. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,472-01, S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Dole) (discussing that "[t]his provision encourages the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, including binding arbitration, where parties knowingly and voluntarily
elect to use these methods. In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the in-
creasing sophistication and reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to
disfavor the use of such forums."); 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01, H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7,
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tion focus on the second half of the committee report section dealing with
"Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution" (both from the Education &
Labor Committee and from the Judiciary Committee): "The Committee
emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution mech-
anisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by
Title VII. ''5 9 Proponents, on the other hand, emphasize the first half of
these same sections: "Section 216 encourages the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution to resolve disputes arising under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act."' 60 Recognizably, when this gray cloud of prelimi-
nary statements and proposals passes, the remedial and deterrent func-
tions of the Civil Rights Act remain.61
As far as the future of binding precedent, the best case scenario would
allow the Supreme Court to address a Title VII case dealing with an em-
ployment arbitration contract not found in a securities industry applica-
tion.62 While the Supreme Court will likely allow this gap to remain
longer than the legal community would prefer, the overwhelming prece-
dent, the express language of the statute, and Gilmer, demonstrate a will-
ingness to support Title VII arbitration. As evidence of its powerful hold,
attempts at the congressional level to quell the current trend toward arbi-
tration have repeatedly failed.63
In the interim, Duffield stands as binding precedent in the Ninth Cir-
cuit-"unless and until the day comes, Duffield is the law of the Ninth
1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (stating that "[t]his provision encourages the use of alter-
native means of dispute resolution . . there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)").
59. H.R. REP. No. 120-40, pt. 1, at 97 (1991).
60. Id.
61. See Gilmer, 500 U.S.,at 28 ("[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)); Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 11 (find-
ing that "[t]he district court's comment that an endorsement of arbitration would be at
odds with the 1991 CRA's creation of a right to a jury trial ... similarly ignores Gilmer's
endorsement of arbitration under the ADEA-which also provides for jury trials," and
that "[wihile people may and do reasonably disagree about whether pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements are a wise way of resolving discrimination claims, there is no 'inherent
conflict' between the goals of Title VII and the goals of the FAA, as Gilmer used that
phrase") (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26) (likewise quoting Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)).
62. See Sheller v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150, 152 (N.D. Ill. 1997)(requiring a minor who signed a mandatory arbitration employment agreement to arbitrate
her Title VII claims).
63. See 145 CONG. REC. S5155-05, S5158 (daily ed. May 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (introducing the "Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999," an amend-
ment to "certain civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to
claims that arise from unlawful employment discrimination"); 145 CONG. REC. E287-01,
E287 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey) (remarking that "[m]andatory
arbitration of civil rights is wrong even if the arbitration process is balanced . . [b]ut, too
often, if has a semblance of impartiality); S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999) (introducing the "Civil
Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999"); 145 CONG. REC. S550-01, S550 (daily ed. Jan.
19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (marking the fourth successive Congress where this




Circuit. ' 64 As evidence of this strength, EEOC v. Luce Forward, Hamil-
ton & Scripps, L.L.P., is instructive. 65 There, a legal secretary refusing to
sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment was denied
the job opportunities.66 The EEOC, on her behalf and individually,
brought suit. While finding the applicant secretary barred on res judicata
grounds by a previous state suit, the court allowed the EEOC's injunctive
suit to go forward.67 In a far-reaching grasp, a California District Court
fully and permanently enjoined the law firm at issue from attempting to
execute agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims.68 This bold restriction
confines individual ability to contract and disregards both the FAA and
Supreme Court precedent. The case substantiates the present gulf
amongst the circuits as to Title VII arbitration clauses. The plea for Su-
preme Court resolution thus persists.
III. CONVERSELY, AUSTIN ALONE UPHOLDS MANDATORY
TITLE VII ARBITRATION UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Altering the scenery by focusing on those arrangements bargained for
by a collective agent, a union, rather than an individual, is interpreted by
every circuit but one to "make[ ] all the difference. '69 This portion of the
Comment takes a critical look at inconsistencies present in this majority
stance.
As discussed in the previous section, Gilmer arguably closed the chasm
created by Gardner-Denver's ban on mandatory Title VII arbitration
agreements agreed to by an individual. For all its worth with regard to
individual agreements, Gilmer judicially constructed a gap as to
mandatory arbitration agreements found in a collective bargaining agree-
ment ("CBA"). 70 At least on the surface, response by the circuits to this
newly created chasm, as in the individual context, created one lone dis-
senter-the Fourth Circuit.71 The Fourth Circuit, in Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc., looked to the federal favoring of arbitra-






69. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996) (Hall, J., dissenting).
70. See Michael B. Kass, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 945 (1999) (stating that "[p]robably one of the most controversial topics in
the fields of labor law and alternative dispute resolution of whether it should be permissi-
ble for a union to waive an employee's right to have statutory rights enforced in a judicial
forum").
71. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Is Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp. the Death
Knell for Alexander v. Gardner-Denver?, SD34 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL ED.
53, 62 (1998) (commenting that the majority of the cases involving mandatory CBA arbi-
tration arrangements "have chosen to follow Gardner-Denver and distinguish Austin on its
facts").
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tion of labor disputes, 72 Gilmer's acceptance of arbitration as an alterna-
tive rather than an inferior forum, 73 and the similarity between a union
and an individual,74 to reject Gardner-Denver's absolute ban on prospec-
tive waivers of a judicial forum in Title VII claims governed by a CBA.
This created a rift in the circuits. 75 In response to this rift, many hoped
the Supreme Court would maneuver precedent a bit by accepting certio-
rari for Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.76 Wright neither over-
ruled Gardner-Denver's holding that CBAs cannot prospectively waive an
individual's right to a judicial forum, nor dismantled Austin's holding that
they can.77 Thus, the rift enlarged.
Bearing in mind that before Gilmer, every circuit adamantly denied
individual waivers of Title VII rights to a judicial forum, 78 and recalling
that after Gilmer, every circuit but one steadfastly embraced the notion as
to individual contracts of employment, 79 Part II disagrees with the major-
ity-agreements to arbitrate under CBAs should be treated no differently
than arrangements under individual contracts. As arsenal to combat the
majority, this Part critically analyzes Gilmer's three reasons for distin-
guishing the Gardner-Denver line of cases:80 (1) those cases were not
72. 78 F.3d at 879 (quoting Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1109 (1986), as demonstrating the "well-recognized policy of
federal labor law favoring arbitration of labor disputes.").
73. See id. at 880 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26) ("[H]aving made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." (quoting Mitsub-
ishi, 473 U.S. at 628)).
74. See id. at 885 (stating that "[t]here is no reason to distinguish between a union
bargaining away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the right to arbitrate").
75. See Moorning-Brown v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1488
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing the split and commenting that Austin's failure to follow
Gardner-Denver was something "which in our view circuit courts are not free to do").
76. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
77. See Jacob E. Tyler, Mandatory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims Under Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements: The Effect Of Wright, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (1999)
(commenting that "the Court expressly left aside the question of whether a 'clear and un-
mistakable waiver' of a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims in favor of arbi-
tration would be enforced."); Harvey R. Boller & Donald J. Peterson, Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, Disp. RESOL. J., February, 1999, at 58 (assessing Wright, and com-
menting that "the most obvious and immediate reaction is one of frustration, because the
important question of whether Gilmer did, in fact, overrule Gardner-Denver remains un-
resolved," and that "the Supreme Court will eventually be required to resolve the issue it
managed to avoid in Wright.").
78. See supra note 16. The same situation is seen under CBAs. Examples of case law
following the majority by foreclosing the ability to prospectively waive rights to a judicial
forum include: Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 512 (1997); Doyle v.
Raley's Inc., 158 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1998); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d
1437, 1453 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S.
947 (1998); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997).
Those in the minority, refusing the preclude arbitration under a CBA include: Austin, 78
F.3d at 885; c.f. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421, rev'd en banc, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir.
1997) (initially following Austin's reasoning, but later reversing).
79. See discussion, supra note 24.
80. In referring to the Gardner-Denver line of cases, authors direct attention to: Alex-
ander, 415 U.S. at 49 (holding that an employee does not forfeit his right to a judicial forum
for adjudication of his Title VII claim after first exhausting administrative grievance
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decided under the FAA, which reflects a liberal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements, (2) arbitration in those cases involved the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate statutory rights as opposed to contractual
rights under a labor contract, and (3) because the arbitration in those
cases occurred in the context of a CBA where claimants were represented
by the union, an important tension between collective representation and
individual, statutory rights exists. 81 One-by-one, each of these arguments
fails in the context of Gilmer, Wright, and the modern union. Once re-
moved, the arbitration arena easily houses both individual agreements
and CBA arrangements.
A. THE CURRENT SETTING: A FEDERAL FAVORING OF
ARBITRATION-BoTH UNDER THE FAA AND UNDER THE LMRA SETS
THE STAGE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF CBA WAIVERS
Gilmer recognized that the FAA was reenacted and codified in 1947 to
reverse a long-standing judicial hostility toward arbitration.82 Further, in
listing other statutory situations where arbitration was enforced, it reiter-
ated that "[ilt is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."' 83 Moreo-
ver, proposed legislation within Congress,84 as well as case law interpret-
ing existing statutes manifest a continued celebration of arbitration as the
wave of the future. Thus, Gilmer, and Congress dispositively embrace
processes under a CBA); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (finding no
preclusive effect on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where the CBA contained a general provision
requiring arbitration); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
(holding that a CBA did not preclude claimant from bringing his Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201 claim to a judicial forum, as the rights stems from a statutory allowance,
not contractual).
81. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
82. See id. at 22.
83. See id. at 24 (discussing the history of enforcing arbitration of claims arising under
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78(b); the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961; and §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2)).
84. See 143 CONG. REC. S8674-01 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
(presenting Senate Resolution 117, celebrating the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Services (FMCS) for fifty years of expert arbitration service and interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements); 144 CONG. REC. H4953-02 (statement of Rep. Bonior) (presenting
a bill, H.R. 2848, the Labor Relations First contract Negotiations Act to allow employees
to organize and bargain collectively for living standards and calling for arbitration under
CBA disputes); 144 CONG. REC. H1445-03 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Lafalce) (presenting H.R. 2578 Amendment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 allowing for arbitration under a CBA as to financial dis-
putes); 144 CONG. REC. S9426-02 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(presenting the Family Investment and Rural Saving Tax Act in an effort to improve the
NLRA and expand remedies available for wrongfully discharged employees under re-
quired arbitration pursuant to a CBA); 145 CONG. REC. S2841-02 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Bingaman) (presenting S. 638, Safe School Security Act, expanding
remedies available to the NLRB through arbitration under a CBA); 145 CONC. REC.
H9523-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1999) (H.R. 2723, Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Im-
provement Act of 1999, authorizing the establishment and maintenance pursuant to a CBA
procedures for ERISA disputes to be resolved through arbitration).
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arbitration of statutory claims under the FAA. As demonstrated in Part
I, every circuit but the Ninth, follows this mandate as to individual em-
ployment contracts signed as a condition of employment.8 5 What then, is
the difficulty when the arbitration arrangement is governed by a CBA?
It would be easiest to say, as several courts and commentators have,
that the differences lie in the governing law: individual contracts of em-
ployment fall under the FAA and are not excluded under Section 1 as
"contracts of employment," 86 but CBAs trap themselves squarely into the
Section 1 exclusion as "contracts of employment" and are thus governed
by the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), the Railway Labor
Act ("RLA"), or some other specialized labor statute. As the argument
goes, labor arbitrators are confined to effectuating the intent of the par-
ties as expressed in the CBA and have no general authority to invoke
public laws, whereas the commercial arbitrator provides a forum for the
vindication of public law rights.8 7 Thus, Gardner-Denver would govern
CBAs, while Gilmer would control individual agreements. The snarl in
this reasoning is that the majority of commentators note that the FAA
governs CBAs, unless they involve transportation or work directly in in-
terstate commerce. 88 Accordingly, the distinction rests on the line of
work, not the contract.
Still persuasive, is the argument taken by Austin-any distinction be-
tween the FAA and the LMRA is false, especially given that Gilmer
found a non-negotiable, adhesion registration form containing the arbi-
tration provision was not a contract for employment excluded from the
FAA.8 9 This argument has merit. If there is a federal favoring of arbitra-
85. See supra note 24.
86. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437,1454 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
we have "previously concluded that [FAA exclusion] encompasses collective bargaining
agreements, and have thus held the FAA 'is generally inapplicable to labor arbitration."')
(quoting United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1989)); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305,
311 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that "this court has held that collective bargaining agreements
are 'contracts of employment' and therefore outside the scope of the FAA"); Brisentine v.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that "the Su-
preme Court has yet to address arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements in
light of Gilmer" with reference to whether they fall under the FAA exception, and noting
the split in the circuits, but finding the CBA at issue indistinguishable from Gardner-Den-
ver); Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999).
87. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453-54.
88. See William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for
Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment: A Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 29, 67
(1998) (stating that "[a]lthough the interpretation of section 1 has garnered a number of
constructions, the general consensus is that the section is limited to employment contracts
involving those who work directly in interstate commerce"); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co.,
109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the Supreme Court's citing with apparent approval a
Seventh Circuit opinion limiting exclusion of employment contracts in section 1 to workers
engaged in physical movement of goods in interstate or foreign commerce as evidence of
their holding).
89. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 883 n.2 (stating that "although we do not rely on the FAA in
this case, we do rely on the federal labor law policy encouraging arbitration of labor dis-
putes as expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy"); Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
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tion, as evidenced by the current ability of labor arbitrators to adjudicate
other protected rights falling under CBAs,90 there should be no distinc-
tion between commercial arbitrators and labor arbitrators. 91 In fact, no-
where in Title VII history is there a discrimination between those
alternative methods of adjudication "authorized by law" in individual
contracts and those in CBAs.92 Simply, the FAA/LMRA distinction can-
not decide this controversy.
Despite this apparent conflict amongst the circuits as to the applicabil-
ity of the FAA, the Supreme Court in Wright declined to consider FAA
applicability under the "circumstances. '93 The "circumstances" likely re-
fer to the failure of the Respondents to argue the FAA applicability issue,
largely due to strong Fourth Circuit precedent opposing FAA applicabil-
ity to CBAs.94 Given that Wright was a longshoreman who surely en-
gaged in interstate commerce and transportation, the issue, if argued,
would probably have fallen within the Section 1 exclusion anyway. 95
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (LMRA codified and interpreted
with the principal rationale that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret
the terms of a CBA).
90. See Martin v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 105 F.3d 40,43 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997) (precluding former employee from bringing her failure to rehire/
retaliation claim to a judicial forum where statutes expressly withhold protection where it
would be "inconsistent with labor agreements"); Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l.,
76 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding, under terms of the CBA, that arbitrator had jurisdic-
tion to decide discharged nonunion pilot's challenge to validity of sympathy strike assess-
ment after termination); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am. Local
No. 15258, 800 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Miss.) (holding that arbitration award resulting in rein-
statement of employees who tested positive for drug use drew its essence from its gov-
erning CBA and was thus enforceable and granted due process rights to employees), affd,
988 F.2d 1214 (1992); U.S. Dept. of Interior v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 1 F.3d 1059
(10th Cir. 1993) (upholding decision of FLRA that arbitrator's determination that Bureau
of Reclamation acted unlawfully in unilaterally terminating pay practice required by CBA
between Bureau and union, and finding that it was not subject to judicial review). But see
Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995) (prohibit-
ing a prospective waiver of Title VII judicial forum rights under the Railway Labor Act).
91. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368 (1974), extended
the presumption of arbitrability to the question of whether a strike was statutorily pro-
tected. Even though there was no no-strike clause in the CBA, the Court recognized this
as inherent in the agreement. This illustrates the extent of the presumption of arbitration,
even under the LMRA.
92. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); O'Neil
v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[n]othing in the
Family and Medical Leave Act suggests that congress wished to exempt disputes arising
under it from the coverage of the FAA.").
93. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 (1998).
94. See id.
95. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 357 (commenting on Professor Finkin's prevailing view
acknowledging that the impetus for the FAA Section 1 exclusion came entirely from the
seafarers union, concerned that arbitrators would be less favorably inclined toward
seamen's claims than judges, in part because of a tradition that seamen were "wards in
admiralty, in part because of peculiarities of maritime law that would make it easy to slip
an arbitration clause into a maritime employment contract without the seaman's noticing
it, and in part because the maritime employment relation was already heavily regulated by
federal law."). The fact that the seafarer's union was the impetus behind the FAA exclu-
sion lends support to Wright's claims falling neatly into this exclusion. Thus, it was proba-
bly wise for the Supreme Court to add to the confusion by addressing FAA applicability in
this clear cut case, especially when the issue was not argued.
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Nevertheless, the explicit failure of the Supreme Court to address this
conflict is noteworthy. If it were clearly inapplicable, the "circumstances"
would not matter. Regardless, the first distinction raised by Gilmer ren-
ders the Gardner-Denver differentiation unsatisfying because, as set forth
above, Title VII makes no distinction. FAA applicability likely turns on
job construction rather than contract formation, and the federal favoring
of arbitration prevails under the LMRA as well as the FAA.
B. THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
RECOGNIZE "CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE" WAIVERS IN CBAs
DESPITE GARDNER-DENVER'S PROHIBITION LIKELY CONTEMPLATES A
CBA ABILITY TO WAIVE TITLE VII's JUDICIAL FORUM GRANT
Looking to Supreme Court precedent for an argument differentiating
CBAs from individual agreements leads to frustration. Gardner-Denver's
unstable foundation admittedly recognizes a federal policy favoring arbi-
tration of labor disputes. 96 Further, it reiterates the congressional policy
embodied in the LMRA to "promote industrial peace and that the griev-
ance-arbitration provision of a collective agreement was a major factor in
achieving this goal."'97 Nevertheless, even in this case where the Plaintiff
had first fully utilized the arbitration mechanism found within his CBA,
judicial efficiency and the federal favoring of arbitration was not enough
to overcome the tension between contractual and statutory objectives. 98
As discussed, the stress results from the labor arbitrators' apparent ability
to resolve only contractual rather than statutory rights.
For all of its worth to Gardner-Denver and its progeny,99 the distinction
between contractual and statutory rights was of so little importance post-
Gilmer that it raised its head only in a footnote in Livadas v. Bradshaw, a
National Labor Relations Act case allowing a former employee to bring
her §1983 claim to the judicial forum- largely because the statute
evinced no other remedy in its history.1 ° Footnote 21 reads:
Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver as relying, inter alia, on: the
'distinctly separate nature of ... contractual and statutory rights' (even
when both were 'violated as a result of the same factual occurrence'), the
fact that a labor 'arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of con-
tractual rights', and the concern that in collective-bargaining arbitration,
'the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the col-
lective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.'1°
96. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45 (citing The Steelworker's Trilogy-United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
97. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at n.6.
98. See id. at 56.
99. See supra note 83.
100. 512 U.S. 107, 126 n.21 (1994).
101. Id. (citations omitted)
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The deliberate failure to rely on any contractual/statutory distinction
effects the Title VII arbitration controversy. The lack of import in Su-
preme Court precedent arguably strengthens the argument for similar
treatment in the CBA context.
In spite of Gardner-Denver's strong opposition to prospective waivers
of the judicial forum, it stands as Supreme Court precedent. To be sure,
Gardner-Denver was qualified by Gilmer to the extent that it held arbitra-
tion as an "inferior" forum.102 Notwithstanding this qualification, it was
not expressly overruled.
The Supreme Court once again failed to elucidate matters in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.0 3 The distinction between individual
agreements and CBAs thus underwent further qualification and frustra-
tion. "This case presents the question whether a general arbitration
clause in a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) requires an employee
to use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the
[ADA].' 0 4 The Court narrowly analyzed the specific CBA in dispute
and issued a highly limited decision that found the CBA at issue too gen-
eral to cover the longshoreman's ADA claim contractually. 10 5 Although,
in a footnote, Wright states that "[w]e take no position [ ] on the effect of
this provision in cases where a CBA clearly encompasses employment
discrimination claims, or in areas outside collective bargaining," it argua-
bly leaves open the availability of waiver. It analyzes the CBA language,
rather than simply holding, as its precedent holds, that there can be no
prospective waiver.106 "[W]e do not find a clear and unmistakable waiver
in the Longshore Seniority Plan. Like the CBA itself, the Plan contains
no antidiscrimination provision; and specifically limits its grievance pro-
cedure to disputes related to the agreement.' a0 7 Wright further instructs:
whether or not Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of
union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer,
Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition that the right to a
federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected
against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA. 10 8
As noted, most read Gardner-Denver as a complete ban on prospective
waivers, not as a protection against those "less than explicit" waivers.
Wright's flexibility with Gardner-Denver as precedent manifests a recog-
nition of the existing confusion amongst the circuits.
What then does Wright add to the present CBA jurisprudence? The
CBA arrangement in Wright, which was a general all "[miatters under
dispute" governance, did not preclude an individual from bringing a Title
102. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.5.
103. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
104. Id. at 72.
105. See id. at 78-79 (holding that the "dispute in the present case, however, ultimately
concerns not the application or interpretation of any CBA, but the meaning of a federal
statute.").
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VII claim to a judicial forum.'0 9 Nonetheless, its holding at least left the
door open for the opportunity to include statutory rights, or an exact ver-
sion, in the CBA.
Further, Wright reaffirmed that a union could waive statutory rights "to
be free of antiunion discrimination," but held that "such a waiver must be
clear and unmistakable.""10 As stated, this arguably qualifies Gardner-
Denver and may turn the importance away from FAA governance and
onto whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is defined explicitly in the
CBA as a contractual issue. Recent case law, however, demonstrates the
need for further clarity.
Interestingly, although the Fourth Circuit is the lone dissenter with re-
gard to CBA pre-dispute waivers, it declined the spotlight in Brown v.
Trans World Airlines, a case preceding Wright."' Governed by Railway
Labor Act, Brown found the plaintiff's Title VII and FMLA claims
outside of the scope of the governing CBA." 2 "While it is true that the
collective bargaining agreement in this case prohibits conduct similar to
that prohibited by Title VII and by the Family and Medical Leave Act,
none of the substantive provisions in the agreement reaches beyond the
agreement to cover disputes arising under these laws."1 13 This reasoning
follows the "clear and unmistakable" mandate of Wright, and also en-
sures that, under normal contract principles, a union does not waive an
individual's right to a judicial forum without notice.
Recognizing the ambiguity inherent in Wright, the D.C. Circuit held
that even after Gilmer and notwithstanding Wright, "Gardner-Denver
stands as a fire wall between individual statutory rights the Congress in-
tended can be bargained away by the union ... and those that remain
exclusively within the individual's control.""114 The Circuit thus inter-
preted Wright as leaving Gardner-Denver fully intact. It found that ab-
sent congressional intent to the contrary, a union cannot "use the
employees' individual statutory right to a judicial forum as a bargaining
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), an NLRA
case, that "we will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended
to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' More
succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable.").
111. 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997).
112. See id. at 341.
113. Id.; see also Carson v. Giant Foods, Inc. 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999) (follow-
ing Brown & Wright in finding no "clear and unmistakable" waiver in a general arbitration
clause because "[b]road, general language is not sufficient to meet the level of clarity re-
quired to affect a waiver in a CBA."); Robinson v. HealthTex, Inc. 215 F.3d 1321 (Table),
No. 99-2023, 2000 WL 691053, at *3 (4th Cir. May 30, 2000) (recognizing two ways to
determine whether a CBA "clearly and unmistakably" waives the right to litigate statuto-
rily based anti-discrimination claims: (1) intent demonstrated by an explicit arbitration
clause drafting; (2) in the case of less clear clauses, employees may be bound if another
provision like a non-discrimination clause makes it clear that discrimination statutes are at
issue).




chip to be exchanged for some benefit to the group."'" 5
In contrast, the Eastern District of New York seized the opportunity
created by Wright to rule that "a new protocol exists for the analysis of
whether Title VII claims are subject to binding arbitration as provided for
under collective bargaining agreements."' " 6 There, the CBA at issue spe-
cifically incorporated the statutory prohibition on sexual harassment and
expressly charged the arbitrator to resolve disputes over whether that
statutory law was breached." 7 It was found to meet the "clear and un-
mistakable" test even though the arbitral proceedings "were expeditious,
and perhaps even 'informal,' as compared with the typical course of liti-
gation in federal district court.""18 This correctly reads Wright. It re-
spects the ability of waiver under the FAA and ensures that an individual
who has previously exhausted the arbitral process does not then claim
"foul play" in the courts.
Given the federal favoring of arbitration found explicitly in Title VII,
the federal favoring of arbitration mandated by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer, and the "clear and unmistakable" language prescribed in Wright,
for a CBA to require arbitration of a statutory right, the language must,
in the least, fall explicitly under the contract." 9 Assuming that the CBA
explicitly, clearly, and unmistakably covers the statutory claim brought by
the plaintiff, and that, as argued, there is no difference between those
contracts covered by the FAA and those covered by the LMRA, prece-
dent may still raises questions as to the inherent conflict of interest be-
tween a majoritarian body representing and negotiating an individual's
independent, statutory rights.' 20 The following Section explores this
argument.
C. BECAUSE A VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS Is NOT
INHERENTLY AT ODDS WITH COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION BY A
UNION, A CBA WAIVER SHOULD BE ENFORCED
As stated in Livadas' footnote 21, Gardner-Denver's concern that "the
interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collec-
tive interests of all employees in the bargaining unit," may be the tendril
that guards against Gardner-Denver's complete collapse. 121 Under Gard-
ner-Denver, "[u]nions [have] the power to waive certain collective rights
(such as the right to strike) to obtain economic benefits for their mem-
115. Id.
116. Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 335.
119. See Bratten v. SSI Serv., Inc., 187 F.3d 621 (tbl.) (6th Cir. 1999) (joining other
courts to recognize that "under a 'clear and unmistakable' standard, the ADA and other
statutory claims must be expressly recounted in the CBA"); Albertson's, Inc. v. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union 157 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that an
FLSA claim governed by the LMRA was statutory, not contractual), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
809 (1999).
120. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 126 n.21.
121. See id.
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bers."'1 22 Courts and commentators note inherent problems with arbitral
resolution of statutory claims under CBAs, including employees' lack of
awareness as to the rights the union is negotiating away, the inability of
the employer to compel arbitration at the hands of a union representa-
tive, and the underlying conflict in having a majoritarian body protect a
worker incapable of protecting himself.' 3
The concern, as stated in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., is that:
We may assume that the union will not engage in actionable discrimi-
nation against minority workers. But we may not assume that it will
be highly sensitive to their special interests, which are the interests
protected by Title VII and the other discrimination statutes, and will
seek to vindicate those interests with maximum vigor.12 4
While the parade of horribles presented by those opposing waivers of
statutory rights through CBAs admittedly raises concerns,12 5 these fears
exist as to individual agreements as well. 126
What power do individuals signing agreements to arbitrate as a condi-
tion of employment wield that a collective bargaining unit does not?
Quite plainly, none. To the contrary, safeguards are more prevalent in
the union context.'2 7 The agreement must clearly and unmistakably
waive an individual's rights (a much higher threshold than Gilmer's affec-
tion toward waivers in industry-wide, adhesion contracts), 2 8 the majority
must vote as to all agreements, the union is bound as a fiduciary to fairly
122. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
123. See Ann E. Ahrens, Collective Bargaining Agreements, Arbitration Provisions and
Employment Discrimination Claims: Compulsory Arbitration or Judicial Remedy?, J. Disp.
RESOL., 1999, at 69 (commenting that because the CBA represents majority rights, it con-
flicts necessarily with minority rights); T. Christopher Baile, Reconciling Alexander and
Gilmer: Explaining the Continued Validity of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. in the
Context of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 219, 238-239 (1999)
(stating that "[a]lthough the courts' concern derives from past treatment of minorities by
the unions, recent cases indicate the concern is still presently valid," and finding that the
rights of minorities will not receive adequate consideration during the CBA negotiations);
Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1454 (commenting that the theoretical possibility of negotiating a
separate deal with individual contracts like Gilmer buts them a step above unionized em-
ployees who have no such choice).
124. 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 512 (1997).
125. A good example of the parade of horribles can be found at Universal Maritime
Serv. Corp., Brief for Petitioner at 26-30, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525
U.S. 70 (1998) (presenting a series of hypotheticals ranging from a co-worker revealing
HIV-positive status to possible hesitation to pursue sexual harassment charges against a
supervisor that the representative works with daily).
126. See Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Work-
place after Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1360 (1999) (cata-
loguing the types of individual contracts containing individual agreements to contract: form
contracts, employment manuals, and clauses in job applications).
127. See Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1999) (remarking on the
higher threshold necessary under a CBA in stating that "[b]road, general language is not
sufficient to meet the level of clarity required to effect a waiver in a CBA. In the collective
bargaining context, the parties 'must be particularly clear' about their intent to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims.") (quoting Wright, 525 U.S. at 79).
128. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
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represent all members,129 as a majority the union has more power to ne-
gotiate, and as a unit that continues to work with the management, there
is an incentive to fairly contract. 130 These factors commingle to create a
situation where the collective group is bound to fairly represent the indi-
vidual and where the individual's voice will not lose the job opportunity
by attempting to negotiate a better deal. In individual contracts signed as
a condition of employment, the consequence of not signing the agree-
ment is simple-no job. In collective bargaining situations, bargaining is
not a myth. As stated by Austin:
A union has the right and duty to bargain for the terms and conditions
of employment. Through the collective bargaining process, unions may
waive the right to strike and other rights protected under the [NLRA].
The Supreme Court finds such waiver 'valid because they rest on the pre-
mise of fair representation.' There is no reason to distinguish between a
union bargaining away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the
right to arbitrate.131
Thus, any distinction between an individual's power over an employer
as to mandatory individual arbitration agreements and a union's power
over an employer as to mandatory CBA arbitration arrangements is a
distinction without a difference. 132 Cleverly argued by Roy:
In the non-union workplace, employees are not represented by unions,
of course, but agree to the terms of their employment on their own. But
the notion that these employees sit down at the "bargaining table" with
their employers and hammer out their own, personalized employment
contract is an illusion. An overwhelming majority of these workers are
never given the opportunity to personalize their employment contracts in
any way. Rather, the non-union, at-will workplace is governed not by
individualized employment agreements, but by form contracts, employ-
ment manuals, and clauses in job applications, all of which include the
terms of employment set forth by the employer. It is within these "agree-
ments" where clauses mandating the arbitration of statutory claims are
likely to be found. 133
129. See DelCostello v. Teamster, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983) (holding that if the union
arbitrarily refuses to prosecute a grievance, let alone refuses on racial or other invidious
grounds to do so, the worker can bring a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair
representation of all members of the bargaining unit); Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d
1530, 1536 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring employees complaining about breaches of a "buy out
plan" to exhaust the administrative remedies of arbitration and the grievance process
before bringing suit, but holding that they have a possible breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation claim against the union).
130. See Roy, supra note 126, at 1350-51 (finding that when the two sets of employees
are compared, those represented by a union are capable of providing the same kind of
consent to a mandatory arbitration clause as non-union employees).
131. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885 (citations omitted).
132. See Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (D. Minn. 1993) (bind-
ing an employee to arbitration of his wrongful discharge claim after the employer unilater-
ally altered the relationship by placing a mandatory arbitration clause in an employee
handbook).
133. Roy, supra note 126.
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In Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' International Union of North
America, the Sixth Circuit authorized a claimant to raise Title VII claims
not only against his union, but also against the international union par-
ent.134 This illustrates the reach of union liability. Long past are the days
when a union can discriminate against its members without fault. Moreo-
ver, Gardner-Denver does not impede an employer from requiring a new
hire to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement as a condition of employ-
ment for entering into an employment contract as a unionized em-
ployee. 135 Thus, if employers are placed in the incongruous situation of
pursuing enforceable waivers with non-union employees but being denied
this efficiency as to unionized employees, the result may be individual
agreements outside of the CBA.
Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. involved a § 1981 claim alleged
by a union member covered by a CBA.136 Reaching for a "more reasona-
ble accommodation of the conflict between vitliating individual statutory
rights and enforcing the express terms of a fairly negotiated contract than
a per se rule barring enforcing the express terms of a fairly negotiated
contract than a per se rule barring enforcement of a CBA mandated arbi-
tration," Almonte enforced the arbitration clause. 137 Although pre-
Wright, Almonte properly handles any stress created by union waivers of
individual rights.
Candidly, concerns that were likely important enough to place in a
footnote in the Gardner-Denver decade do not carry such force today.
As illustrated by the onset of duty of fair representation suits and the
ability of the complainant to pursue statutory claims, such as Title VII,
directly against the union itself, the collective scenery no longer emanates
but one voice.' 38
D. STARE DECISIS AND THE REALITY OF TITLE VII's PLAIN
MEANING MANIFESTS A NEED TO OVERRULE GARDNER-
DENVER AND TO RESPECT CBA WAIVERS
Gilmer's attempts to distinguish the union situation from the non-union
arrangement fail. The FAA/LMRA distinction is a false separation.
134. Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 87 Daily Lab. Rep. E-1
(6th Cir. May 6, 1999).
135. See John J. Gallagher & Margaret H. Spurlin, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Claims, ALI-ABA, 1999, at 685 (commenting that even though the union
might object that such an individual arbitration agreement usurps their duty to exclusively
bargain with the carrier, there should be no conflict given that the union has no lawful
authority to bargain for statutory claims/waivers).
136. 959 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1997).
137. Id. at 574.
138. For an example of cooperative CBA accommodation, see Rodriguez v. City of Chi-
cago, 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1998) (illustrating union cooperation and accommodation
under a CBA where a police officer raised Title VII religious concerns over the guarding of
an abortion clinic); Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983) (noticeably
increasing the liability of unions as to back wages, compensatory damages and attorneys
fees, and likely accelerating the willingness of a union to accommodate members in the
arbitral process in an effort to avoid the judicial forum).
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Both contemplate broad, remedial power as to the contract at issue, and
both promote, as their backdrop, the federal favoring of arbitration.
What is more, many CBA arrangements fall under the FAA. 139 Likewise,
the contract versus statute differentiation is easily treated by Wright's
"clear and unmistakable" admonishment. 140 Finally, alleged tension be-
tween a collective representative and an individual masquerades a dis-
trust for the arbitral process that was expressly renounced by Gilmer.1
41
Claims against the union, either as a breach of its duty to fairly represent
its members or as an independent statutory violation, serve as a union
incentive to avidly pursue individual claims.142 Add to these assertions
the fact that nothing in Title VII distinguishes the use of individual arbi-
tration mechanisms "authorized by law" from CBA mechanisms, and the
situation becomes clear-mandatory arbitration agreements under CBAs
stand, at the very least, in the same shoes as individual agreements. 143
These underpinnings, combined with the current Supreme Court's will-
ingness to recognize the plain language of a statute as explicit, should
have led Wright to go a step further in closing the chasm created by Gil-
mer.144 Because Title VII finds no distinction between agreements to ar-
bitrate found in CBAs and those found in individual contracts, the plain
language of the statute releases the precedential hold of Gardner-Den-
ver.145 Nonetheless, in the wake of Wright, Gardner-Denver stands.
In Agostini v. Felton, the Court stated that "'[s]tare decisis is not an
inexorable command,' but instead reflects a policy judgment that 'in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right."1 46 Judging from this reading of stare decisis and
139. See supra notes 89-91.
140. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
141. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (rejecting claims remarking on the inferior nature of
arbitration).
142. See Connye Y. Harper, Threshold Issues in Initiating and Responding to a Sexual
Harassment Lawsuit-Should You Sue the Union, Too?, ABA CENTER FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. NAT'L INST., 1998 (discussing the trend in bringing Title VII claim for race
or sex harassment against a union as well).
143. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); State-
ment of President George Bush upon signing S. 1745, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768,
769 ("section 118 of the Act encourages voluntary agreements between employers and
employees to rely on alternative mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration. This pro-
vision is among the most valuable in the Act because of the important contribution that
voluntary private arrangements can make in an effort to conserve the scarce resources of
the Federal judiciary for those matters as to which no alternative forum would be possible
or appropriate.").
144. See Fla. Prepaid PostSecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
660-665 (1999) (Rehnquist, J., holding that the congressional intent was "unmistakably
clear" in the language of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
as to preclude states' sovereign immunity); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
494 (1999) (O'Connor, J., using the plain present indicative of the words "substantially
limited" to hold, contrary to every circuit but one, that "disability" under the ADA is to be
evaluated with regard to mitigating measures such as medication); Martin v. Hadix, 527
U.S. 343, 353 (1999) (O'Connor, J., holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits
fees by its unambiguous address to the statute's temporal reach).
145. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
146. 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (citations omitted).
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working from the previous analysis of Gilmer's three distinctions from
Gardner-Denver, the doctrine appears inapplicable.
The present confusion should not boil down to a reluctance to "overtax
the country's belief in the Court's good faith."'1 47 Any distinction be-
tween CBAs and individual agreements is flanked with inconsistencies.' 48
IV. THE EEOC STANDS ALONE IN ITS HYPOCRITICAL
POLICY AGAINST EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND IN ITS NEED FOR
SWEEPING RESTRUCTURE
Building on the background from Part I and II, Part III looks to the
agency charged with the official enforcement of Title VII-the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 149 As stated by Pres-
ident Carter in his Reorganization Plan, the EEOC's "experience and
broad scope make [it] suitable for the role of principal Federal agency in
fair employment enforcement.''150 The highly deferential grant of execu-
tive authority shifted the responsibilities of eighteen somewhat overlap-
ping governmental units to the EEOC and authorized the EEOC, with
specific reference to Title VII, to "act[ ] on individual complaints and also
initiate[ ] private sector cases involving a 'pattern or practice' of discrimi-
nation.' 5' As will be examined, herein lies the confusion. Reconciling
the EEOC's disgust for Title VII pre-dispute waivers with the federal pol-
icy and judicial precedent enforcing Title VII arbitration is difficult in the
EEOC's current structure. After attempting to dissect the current model,
this Part assembles an alternate archetype, one that retains the EEOC's
"pattern and practice" enforcement abilities but reconsiders cease and
desist authority.
A. DESPITE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT EMBRACING ARBITRATION,
AND REGARDLESS OF THE FAA, THE EEOC's CONTINUED OPPOSITION
TO EMPLOYER ARBITRATION CONTRACTS CREATES AN
INCONSISTENT PLIGHT
The EEOC consistently opposes employer/employee pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements, either signed as a condition of employment or agreed
147. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O'Connor, J., commenting, in
what appeared to most to be a wholesale retreat from Roe v. Wade and its trimester ap-
proach to abortion as a fundamental right, that overruling Roe would "seriously weaken
the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of
a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.").
148. See Prince v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 F. Supp.2d 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (il-
lustrating a post-Wright case following, at least in theory, the "clear and unmistakable"
standard, which in practice looks more like contract principles of knowing and voluntary
waiver).
149. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4
(Supp. 1995)).
150. Reorganization Plan No. 1, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at




to through a CBA.152 While stating that it "is not unmindful of the case
law enforcing specific mandatory arbitration agreements,"'153 the EEOC,
in its July 10, 1997 Policy Statement, denounced arbitration as an im-
proper tribunal to adjudicate statutory claims due to its: (1) inherent, in-
curable limitations, such as its private nature, its failure to develop law,
and its procedural limitations; 154 (2) structural biases against discrimina-
tion plaintiffs;155 and (3) adverse affects on the EEOC's ability to enforce
the Civil Rights laws.156 This Policy Statement was reaffirmed in the
EEOC's April 10, 1997 Notice on non-waivable employee rights:
A strong public policy prohibits interference with governmental law
enforcement activities. Agreements that prevent employees from
cooperating with EEOC during enforcement proceedings interfere
with enforcement activities because they deprive the Commission of
important testimony and evidence needed to determine whether a
violation has occurred. Furthermore, insofar as such agreements
make it more difficult for the Commission to prosecute past viola-
tions, an atmosphere is created that tends to foster future violations
of the law.157
Notably, in Borg-Warner Protective Service Corp. v. EEOC, an em-
ployer challenged the EEOC's authority to issue policy statements such
as this.158 The D.C. District Court found no federal question jurisdiction
under either the Administrative Procedure Act or the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act and also failed to find Article III standing. 159 While employer
success in this suit is lacking, the case underscores the turmoil resulting
from the EEOC's bold moves against precedent. Likewise, in EEOC v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, L.L.P., the EEOC took advantage
of the Ninth Circuit's anti-arbitration jurisprudence to challenge an em-
152. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465,1478 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
"[diespite the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of arbitration of statutory claims ...
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has taken the position that such agree-
ments are unenforceable ...."); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir.
1999) (disagreeing with the EEOC's position as amicus curiae contending that employees
cannot agree to arbitrate Title VII claims in predispute agreements), affd, 173 F.3d 933
(4th Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
EEOC's position in its amicus brief); John J. Gallagher & Margaret H. Spurlin, Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Claims, SD50 ALI-ABA 665, 673 (1999) (quoting
EEOC Associate General Counsel Peggy Mastroianni as saying that "mandatory arbitra-
tion of employment disputes is the greatest threat to civil rights enforcement.").
153. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-
4, I (July 11, 1997). For a discussion upholding the EEOC's ability to issue policy state-
ments without interfering in an employer's ability to require employees to sign mandatory
arbitration agreements, see Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp. v. EEOC, 81 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2000).
154. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 3-4, (V)(A) (July 11, 1997).
155. See id. at (V)(B).
156. See id. at (V)(C).
157. Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waivable Employee Rights Under EEOC Enforced
Statutes, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 801, at 6531 (1999).
158. 81 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2000).
159. Id. at 28, 29.
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ployer's right to require arbitration as a condition of employment. 160 The
California District Court took the bait and permanently enjoined a law
firm from requiring, requesting, or enforcing any arbitration employment
agreement. 161 The reach of this uncharacteristic move, though questiona-
ble on legal grounds, is worrisome.
Plainly, the EEOC's logic is faulty. First, arbitration is not inferior due
to its private nature. The EEOC notably ignores the fact that the vast
majority of EEOC-handled cases not only settle before they provide
precedential value, but are encouraged to do so by the EEOC.162 What is
more, recent publicity focuses on the EEOC's Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR) Program and the agency's plans to utilize this expeditious
method of resolution to cure its current backlog plague. 163 Basically, the
EEOC sees its own ADR program as voluntary and just, but, in a some-
what paternalistic fashion, adamantly opposes employer/employee pre-
dispute waivers as an appalling denial of civil rights. The EEOC's second
argument, that arbitration fosters structural biases against the plaintiff,
rests on an inherent distrust of the arbitral process-a distrust that was
emphatically rejected by Gilmer.164 Finally, the EEOC attempts to argue
that pre-dispute waivers will adversely affect its enforcement powers.
This argument disregards Gilmer once again. As emphasized by Justice
White, a "claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to
file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to
institute a private judicial action."'1 65 Each proffered argument tumbles.
Nevertheless, the EEOC refuses to budge. Despite increased employ-
ment litigation and tremendous backlogs in the handling of cases within
the EEOC process 166 and regardless of internal arbitration proceedings
160. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2000).
161. Id.
162. See David Sherwyn et al., In Defense Of Mandatory Arbitration Of Employment
Disputes: Saving The Baby, Tossing Out The Bath Water, And Constructing A New Sink In
The Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 130 (1999) (commenting on the priority han-
dling used by the EEOC that works to encourage quick settlement of disputes).
163. See EEOC: Former EEOC Commissioner Sees Agency Deferring to ADR Pro-
grams, 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Mar. 3, 1998) (Gilbert F. Casellas, former chairman
of the EEOC commenting on the benefits given to claimants in the EEOC's new multi-step
ADR program, such as resolution in half the time of litigation); EEOC: "Significant" Ex-
pansion of ADR Program in the Works, Chairwoman Castro Says, 234 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) C-1 (Dec. 7, 1998) (Chairwoman of the EEOC, Ida Castro, commenting that the
thirty-seven million dollar increase in the EEOC's 1999 budget will help the EEOC expand
its ADR program).
164. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34 n.5.
165. Id. at 28.
166. See Sherwyn, supra note 162, at 76 (citing a four-hundred percent increase in dis-
crimination cases filed in federal court over the past twenty years, and a one-hundred and
nine percent increase in discrimination cases filed in federal court between 1991 and 1995).
Despite necessary changes in the EEOC's priority handling that requires investigators to
place cases in "A," "B," or "C" categories depending on their priority, tremendous waits
still accompany an aggrieved individual wanting to pursue resolution. See Pryner v. Trac-
tor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 512 (1997) (finding that
"[b]ecause the [EEOC] has an enormous backlog and limited resources for litigating, the
vast majority of workers who have claims under any of the statutes that the Commission
enforces have perforce to bring and finance their own lawsuits; they cannot rely on the
2001]
SMU LAW REVIEW
and inherent conciliation efforts that support arbitration only on its
terms, the EEOC continues to vehemently oppose pre-dispute waivers of
the judicial forum.
What does this unbending stance contemplate for the continued suc-
cess of pre-dispute waivers in the employment context? Probably, little.
Although the EEOC is the agency charged with directing and implement-
ing Title VII, it is unlikely that these views will be given great defer-
ence.167 No reference to the EEOC's stance appeared in Gilmer even
though it found unpersuasive the argument that arbitration will under-
mine the role of the EEOC.168 Perhaps the Court would have focused
more on this conflict between agency rights and individual rights had the
case not fallen under the ADEA, where, unlike Title VII, the EEOC's
role is not dependent on the filing of a charge. 169 Regardless of the
EEOC's fervent opposition, however, the Court emphasized the ability of
an individual to waive his right to a judicial forum.
The EEOC's position conflicts with Supreme Court precedent embrac-
ing pre-dispute waivers knowingly entered into and the federal favoring
of arbitration and battles the plain language of both the FAA and Title
VII. In fact, congressional discussions over increasing the EEOC budget
for FY 1999, included congressional leaders and management attorneys
chastising the EEOC for its refusal to support mandatory arbitration
agreements. 170 The following section discusses how this trivial standoff
Commission to do so for them."); Peter T. Kilborn, Backlog of Cases is Overwhelming Job-
Bias Agency, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1994, at 1 ("People fall out of the system... It's like the
urban court system. Clogged. Justice delayed, justice denied."); Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: Mandatory Arbitration Better for Workers With EEOC, Courts Stretched, Professor
Says, 151 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-2 (Aug. 6, 1997) ("In light of an overworked, un-
derfunded EEOC and backlogged court dockets, St. Antoine argued that most employees
might be better off with mandatory arbitration-even of statutory claims ...).
167. Although agencies directed by Congress to issue regulations constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment, the degree of deference given varies from case to case.
See Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 582-83 (1999) (holding that the Department of
Justice's regulations issued under Title II warranted respect). But see Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (giving the EEOC no deference where the EEOC guidelines
to the ADA advising individual disability to be evaluated without regard to medication or
mitigating measures constituted an impermissible construction of the ADA). Given that
the Gilmer holding rested on a contrary construction of permissible arbitration agreement,
and that the EEOC Notices likely don't carry the weight of regulations, deference should
not be great. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 382 (1999) (com-
menting on possible heightened deference to an agency when notice-and-comment
rulemaking processes are observed). But see Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999) (refusing to defer to the EEOC's definition of
"waiver" in the OWBPA as including arbitration agreements because the Court "[does] not
defer to views espoused only in the context of litigation ... This is particularly true where
the agency has gone through rule making and has conspicuously ignored the topic in its
rules.") (citations omitted).
168. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
169. See EEOC v. American & Efird Mills, 964 F.2d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "[u]nlike the limited authority given the EEOC under Title VII ... the ADEA gives
the EEOC authority to investigate and enforce independent of individual employee
charges.").
170. See EEOC: Republicans Tie EEOC Budget Boost to Elimination of Initiative on
Testers, 3/5/98 Emp. Pol'y & Lab. Daily (BNA) d7 (1998) (Fred Alvarez, former commis-
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creates troublesome predicaments for the EEOC's dual role as federal
enforcer and individual representative.
B. INHERENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE EEOC's DUAL ROLE AND
THE MODERN RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT MANDATE RESTRUCTURING
This Section attempts to navigate through the agitated waters gener-
ated by the EEOC's right to sue both on behalf of the individual injured
by discrimination and independent of any private plaintiff's rights "to vin-
dicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination."'17'
Title VII's multistep enforcement program allows the Commission to in-
vestigate and remedy discrimination by authorizing it to bring a civil ac-
tion in federal district court against private employers reasonably
suspected of violating Title VII.172 Although an EEOC charge is neces-
sary for an enforcement action, either by an aggrieved individual or by a
Commissioner, 173 once this charge is filed, an EEOC investigation must
take place, and the EEOC is given flexible subpoena power to carry out
this investigative role.174 Following the investigation, if no reasonable
cause is found to believe the charge is true, the individual is then author-
ized to file a private action against the employer on its own.175 On the
other hand, if reasonable cause is found, enforcement actions can be
brought only by the Commission to seek either relief for one or a group
of aggrieved individuals or to pursue broader, public relief through pat-
tern-or-practice suits. 176 As explained, this structure leaves the EEOC
controlling private as well as public employment discrimination litigation
under the reasoning that "private litigants cannot adequately represent
the government's interest in enforcing the prohibitions of federal stat-
utes."'1 77 The schizophrenic consequence creates an unworkable model
when combined with the presumption that "as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like
sioner, commenting that the "EEOC could make a major contribution toward prompt res-
olution of discrimination complaints if it embraced rather than resisted employer-
established ADR... ").
171. Gen. Tel. Co., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
172. See id. at 325-26.
173. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984) (discussing the situations where
a Commissioner may file a charge: either when a victim of discrimination is reluctant to file
of charge because of fear of retaliation, or where the Commissioner files charges in writing,
under oath, and with such information as the Commission requires).
174. See id. at 63-64.
175. See id. at 64 n.13.
176. See Gen. Tel. Co., Inc., 446 U.S. at 328 (explaining the changes in enforcement
power subsequent to the 1972 amendments that gave the EEOC not only the right to bring
suit pursuant to a private charge, but also the authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits).
177. EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
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defense to arbitrability."'1 78 Because the FAA presumes agreements to
arbitrate between individuals should be valued, the EEOC's control-cen-
tered role navigating individual claims of discrimination in addition to
pattern-or-practice suits directly interferes with the FAA. This discord, if
unrestrained, leads to symphonic disaster.
Courts addressing this interplay vary in reaction-from a lackadaisical
Gilmer,179 to an application of res judicata as to individual relief at the
hands of the EEOC following individual adjudication in the arbitral fo-
rum,180 to a wholesale limitation or strengthening of the EEOC's role. 81
For example, the Eighth Circuit found no interference with the EEOC's
role: "the public policy of the statute will be carried out through suits of
employees who are not parties to arbitration agreements, through EEOC
actions, and through the vindication of individual claims through arbitra-
tion.1 82 For all its worth in the abstract, this unresponsive position be-
comes less convincing when the EEOC seeks to vindicate an individual's
rights in federal court after signing a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate
all Title VII claims with his employer. This was the situation in EEOC v.
Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.183 There, the Sixth Circuit went beyond
finding that an individual cannot contract away her right to file a charge
with the EEOC:184
To empower a private individual to take away this congressional
mandate, by entering into arbitration agreements or other contrac-
tual arrangements, would grant that individual the ability to govern
whether and when the EEOC may protect the public interest and
further our national initiative against employment discrimination,
and to thereby undo the work of Congress in its 1972
amendments. 185
Although the district court applied the FAA in ordering the plaintiff to
arbitrate in accordance with her agreement, Frank's Nursery found not
only that the EEOC could not be bound by this agreement, but also that
178. Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
179. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (finding unpersuasive the argument that a federal favor-
ing of arbitration will interfere with the EEOC's role because the aggrieved individual will
still be free to file a charge with the EEOC).
180. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1292-93 (authorizing separate actions on the same
subject would render inconsequential both the provision for permissive intervention by the
EEOC in an individual's suit, and the requirement of a certificate from the EEOC before
bringing suit); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1990) ("individuals
who fully litigated their own claims under the ADEA are precluded by res judicata from
obtaining individual relief in a subsequent EEOC action based on the same claims").
181. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the power to decide whether adjudication takes place in an arbitral setting or a judicial
setting rests in the hands of the EEOC-based reasonable cause determination). But see
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
182. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997).
183. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
184. See EEOC v. Cosmair Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Astra
USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding policy requiring employees to waive their
right to file an EEOC as a condition of settlement void as against public policy).
185. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 177 F.3d at 459.
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the plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate only bound her if the EEOC gave
her the right to proceed individually by a finding of no cause. 186 By this
rationale, the EEOC controls the individual suit, not the individual. Ac-
cordingly, the agreement to arbitrate can only be respected if the EEOC
finds no reasonable cause. "[W]hile Title VII affords recovery through
private action or an action by the EEOC, it does not allow both, and the
power to decide which route to follow rests in the hands of the EEOC,
not the aggrieved employee. ' 18 7 The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed this protec-
tive right of the EEOC to control an individual's forum in EEOC v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.: "[w]e need not fear that employees will sidestep
arbitration agreements by having the EEOC bring suits for damages on
their behalf because the decision whether to pursue a charge rests with
the EEOC. ' 188 Flatly, the Sixth Circuit misinterprets the role of the
EEOC and the effect of the FAA.
Aside from the Sixth Circuit's EEOC-centered approach to the con-
flict, another camp exists. This second group concentrates on separating
the components of the dual nature of the EEOC to enforce individual
arbitration agreements as to the aggrieved individual's relief while still
allowing the EEOC to carry out its governmental role in the demise of
discrimination. Even within this group of circuits enforcing the individual
arbitration agreement, however, contrariety simmers. The Second Cir-
cuit, in EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., held that an employee's
arbitration agreement precluded the EEOC from seeking purely mone-
tary relief for the employee. 189 However, it authorized the EEOC to
seek injunctive relief in the federal forum, even for employees who were
bound by arbitration agreements:
[A]llowing the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief in the federal forum
while encouraging arbitration of the employee's claim for private
remedies, strikes the right balance between these interests. Further,
to permit an individual, who has freely agreed to arbitrate all em-
ployment claims, to make an end run around the arbitration agree-
ment by having the EEOC pursue back pay or liquidated damages
on his or her behalf would undermine the Gilmer decision and the
FAA.190
Although the Second Circuit differed from the Sixth by recognizing
that allowing the EEOC to dodge an employer/employee contract any
time it found reasonable cause would dishonor the FAA, it stopped short
of precluding the EEOC from obtaining equitable or injunctive relief on
behalf of the aggrieved employee. The court differentiated individual,
injunctive relief from individual, monetary relief by finding the "public
186. See id. at 462.
187. Id. at 466.
188. EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1999).
189. 156 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1998).
190. Id. at 303.
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interest in back pay award [ ] minimal."' 191 For all its worth in valuing the
individual's right to contract, this distinction between monetary and equi-
table individual relief is seriously flawed. A contract to settle all individ-
ual claims in the arbitral forum should be valued in its entirety.
As did the Second Circuit in Kidder, the Fourth Circuit in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., held that an employee arbitration agreement found in
an employment application governed an aggrieved employee's ADA
claim, despite the EEOC's finding of reasonable cause. 192 Conversely,
the Fourth Circuit held that "when the EEOC enforces the individual
rights of [the plaintiff] by seeking backpay, reinstatement, and compensa-
tory and punitive damages, it must recognize [his] prior agreement to ad-
judicate those rights in the arbitral forum."'1 93 Thus, although stating that
it agreed with the balance struck by the Second Circuit, the Fourth Cir-
cuit precluded the EEOC from seeking singular, injunctive relief-thus,
limiting the EEOC to seeking pattern-or-practice type relief only. 194 This
legitimate balance properly evaluates the FAA's goals and the EEOC's
purposes:
When the EEOC seeks "make whole" relief for a charging party, the
federal policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agree-
ments outweighs the EEOC's right to proceed in federal court be-
cause in that circumstance, the EEOC's public interest is minimal, as
the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather than public,
interests. On the other hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale
injunctive relief, the balance tips in favor of EEOC enforcement ef-
forts in federal court because the public interest dominates the
EEOC's action.195
Although not a perfect model, the Fourth Circuit is closest to satisfying
both the EEOC and the FAA. Nevertheless, the common denominator,
the prevalent marauder, continues to be the disguised, dual natured
agency.
In its current state, both the individual and the EEOC are placed in a
precarious position. The individual must exhaust his administrative reme-
dies by filing a charge with the EEOC and must await authority from the
EEOC to file suit.196 Admittedly, the individual may intervene in the
EEOC's suit on his behalf, but as it stands, he may not withdraw his
charge without EEOC approval. Likewise, the EEOC's awkward, dual
191. Id. at 302 (quoting EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
192. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999).
193. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
194. See id. at 812.
195. Id.; EEOC v. World Sav. and Loan Assoc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835 (D. Md. 1999)
(reaffirming the Fourth Circuits holding in a case where an EEOC suit seeking equitable
and monetary relief on behalf of two employee individuals bound by pre-dispute waivers
was dismissed pending a determination of whether the equitable relief sought was class-
based equitable relief not "owned" by the aggrieved individuals).
196. See EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
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role requires it to wear both the hat of the individual and that of the
government:
[t]he EEOC is authorized to proceed in a unified action and to ob-
tain the most satisfactory overall relief even though competing inter-
ests are involved and particular groups may appear to be
disadvantaged.... The EEOC exists to advance the public interest in
preventing and remedying employment discrimination, and it does so
in part by making the hard choices where conflicts of interest
exist. 197
Noting this crudeness on several occasions, the Supreme Court found
that "[tihe result is considerable awkwardness when complainants try to
fit allegations of systemic discrimination into a mold designed primarily
for individual claims."1 98 Add to this equation a binding individual arbi-
tration agreement, and, as the cases display, turmoil ensues.
Nothing prevents the EEOC from seeking injunctive relief in its role as
a public enforcer. The line, however, should be drawn at singular, injunc-
tive relief such as reinstatement because this uses the judicial system to
capitalize on the EEOC's dual role at the expense of the FAA's federal
favoring of arbitration and right of contact. Surely the contract contem-
plated the arbitration of injunctive relief benefiting the individual as well
as monetary or legal relief. While confusing the issue with its privity anal-
ysis, a California district court understood the public versus singular in-
junctive relief distinction in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, L.L.P.199 It barred any injunctive relief on behalf of the ag-
grieved individual under res judicata grounds rather than with respect to
the arbitration clause. Nevertheless, it allowed the EEOC to seek injunc-
tive relief against the defendant to enjoin it from using or enforcing the
arbitration agreement at issue. The outcome, because it follows Duf-
field's circumvention of Supreme Court precedent, is flawed, but the right
of the EEOC to vindicate public rights is exemplary.
C. TOOLS, SUCH AS CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS, AND REQUIRED
REPORTING, COMBINED WITH SEPARATION OF EEOC PUBLIC POLICY
ENFORCEMENT FROM INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT, IF
PROMULGATED, MIGHT NECESSARILY MEND THE CONFUSION
The EEOC's binary role cannot effectively serve both the FAA and its
internal structure of fully interfering with an individual's right to contract.
This Section proposes a separation between the EEOC's public duty and
its private obligation-strengthening its authorization as to the vindica-
tion of broad, public rights while alleviating the tension caused by control
over individual suits. The EEOC's underlying purpose in combating
workplace discrimination will remain at the heart of the organization,
197. Id.; see also EEOC, supra note 163 (former EEOC Chairman commenting that the
EEOC has an "institutional schizophrenia" because of its dual role in developing law and
litigating cases, and in processing claims).
198. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 67 (1984).
199. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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and, in practice, will materialize in the form of: pattern-or-practice suits;
cease and desist orders as to public practices; and mandatory reporting.
But, its conflicting role as an individual representative will be eliminated.
According to an assessment of the EEOC compiled by the Citizens Com-
mission on Civil Rights, the EEOC lacks adequacy in its "no cause" find-
ing rate which "hovers at a record high of 61 percent, up from a 28.5
percent 'no-cause' rate in fiscal year 1980," ought to increase its emphasis
on systemic litigation and Equal Pay Act cases, and needs to continue its
support for employment "testers" to uncover discrimination in the work-
place.200 The model below answers these deficiencies by concentrating
on systemic, public vindication rather than individual, private relief.
Clearly, the EEOC acts "to vindicate the public interest in preventing
employment discrimination. '20 1 As seen, however, problems arise when
this public interest clashes with the enforcement of an employer/em-
ployee contract. Largely, the difficulty rests on the role that filing a
charge fills in Title VII's statutory scheme. "The EEOC has no authority
to conduct an investigation based on hunch or suspicion, no matter how
plausible that hunch or suspicion may be."'202 Thus, while the EEOC may
have the public interest at heart, control over the aggrieved individual is,
at least indirectly through a charge, necessary. First and foremost, this
parasitic relationship must be severed. While not advocating non-filing
covenants in any way,203 the EEOC should have the ability to challenge
policies and actions of employers without an aggrieved individual or
Commissioner's charge.204 In this sense, the individual's right to contract
with his employer is valued under the FAA, but the EEOC still has the
authority to police discriminatory activities and the employee still has the
ability to settle his claims in arbitration. 20 5 Further, an employee's right
in aiding the EEOC's investigation as to these discriminatory practices,
200. Civil Rights: Advocacy Group Sees Mixed Record on Enforcement Efforts at
EEOC, 11 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-10 (Jan. 19, 1999).
201. General Tel. Co., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
202. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 746 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussion the depen-
dency of the Commission's power on the filing of a charge of discrimination, unlike other
federal agencies possessing plenary investigative power).
203. See id. at 747 (discussing public policy arguments for and against non-filing cove-
nants as a condition of settlement or employment).
204. By allowing the EEOC to challenge employer practices without a charge, even
those individuals bound by arbitration agreements would have the EEOC policing their
activities. See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (allowing the EEOC to challenge the validity of an employer ADR
policy even before the enforcement of the arbitration agreement as being void as against
public policy due to its attempt to divest an individual's ability to file a charge with the
EEOC); EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of St. Colleges & Univ., 957 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir.
1992) (allowing the EEOC to challenge an arbitration agreement as void as against public
policy where the CBA provided that grievances will proceed to arbitration only if the em-
ployee refrains from participating in protected activity under the ADEA), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 906 (1992).
205. See Williams v. Cigna Fin'l Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 757 (5th Cir. 1999) (an
arbitration award may be vacated for "manifest disregard" where the award is contrary to
public policy, the award is arbitrary and capricious, or the award fails to draw its essence
from the underlying contract), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1833 (2000).
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even if the employee is bound by a pre-dispute waiver, must not be
hampered:
In contrast to the individual right to recover damages, however, an em-
ployee's right to communicate with the EEOC must be protected, not to
safeguard the settling employee's entitlement to recompense but instead
to safeguard the public interest. It is not a right that an employer can
purchase from an employee, nor is it a right that an employee can sell to
her employer. A waiver of the right to assist the EEOC would offend
public policy under both the ADEA and Title VII.20 6
In fact, reporting of claims should be required. In addition to the an-
nual reports currently filed by employers with the EEOC and with the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs of the Department of
Labor, the employer would be required to submit any adverse discrimina-
tion claim to the EEOC, whether resulting in a settlement, a conciliation,
or favorable and/or unfavorable arbitration.20 7 This, combined with sub-
poena and investigative power independent of a charge, allows the
EEOC to obtain information from employees, permits individuals to
bring suit without waiting 180 days, and entitles individuals to freely con-
tract without EEOC interference. In situations where a relationship is
not bound by an arbitration agreement, reporting requirements would
likewise be placed on the employer. Thus, in both situations the EEOC
has the ability to utilize its public power to seek broad relief.
In addition to strengthening the EEOC's ability to bring pattern-or-
practice suits by dismissing the need for a charge, the EEOC, as was the
case in the initial draft of the amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
should be authorized to issue cease and desist orders.208 Cease and desist
orders under this proposed model would not authorize the EEOC to in-
terfere with individual relief.209 Rather, cease and desist orders would be
tied to pattern-or-practice investigations. In this sense, as is different
from the proposed cease and desist orders that failed in both houses of
Congress, the EEOC authority expands as to the policing of broad scale
discriminatory patterns or activities, but diminishes as to individual relief.
Accordingly, the EEOC's dual role is dismantled, the confusion over
where to separate public and private relief is quelled, and the FAA is
respected. Thus, the EEOC would combat workplace discrimination as a
true enforcement agency with the threat of pattern-or-practice suits and
206. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d at 744 n.5.
207. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 70-71 (discussing the recording requirements of em-
ployers, and the ability of the EEOC to receive pattern-or-practice information from these
records).
208. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 362 (1977) (discussing the
dominant debate in Congress during the EEOC's formation as to the power of the EEOC
to issue cease and desist orders).
209. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 457 (6th Cir. 1999)
(commenting on the battle between the minority favoring of district court enforcement
authority following failed conciliation efforts and the majority favoring of cease and desist
authority, and discussing the minority's win over the majority).
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cease and desist orders rather than a political design with a confused,
clashing, severely backlogged infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal chaos resulting from unanswered questions in major Supreme
Court cases dealing with arbitration of statutory causes of action, and
seemingly conflicting pronouncements by the agency directly responsible
for managing claims stemming from workplace discrimination leaves
many in the legal and employment community concerned. Duffield and
any claim by the EEOC tempting the deterioration of the FAA should
the definite past. Given the vigor with which it is currently followed in
the Ninth Circuit, however, a supreme court pronouncement is necessary.
Austin and its appreciation of both the FAA and the LMRA as an alter-
native rather than an inferior adjudication setting, even in collective bar-
gaining instances where negotiation power is genuine and duty of fair
representation claims are real, is the tangible future. For the present,
conflicting goals create friction between the federal favoring of arbitra-
tion under the FAA and EEOC opposition to arbitration, at least when
arbitration is initiated between individuals rather than internally in the
EEOC itself. This structural tension necessitates dismantling EEOC con-
trol over individual claims in exchange for a single-natured agency au-
thorized to bring pattern-or-practice suits and issue cease and desist
orders.
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